BARBARITY AND BANALITY

The barbarity and downright wickedness of the Nazis has posed millions of questions and will pose millions more. The normal thinking person's utter revulsion is characterised by questions as to why any human being could act to others in that bestial way. Hannah Arendt wrote The Banality of Evil after viewing the Eichmann trial. Arendt, rather than condemning out of hand, as most would, tried to elicit a degree of understanding from a trial that would disgust most, and as a Jew her views command attention. Arendt's use of the phrase 'banality of evil' has caused much discussion. What does it actually mean? Arendt died in 1976, so she had little time to explain or to ruminate on her phrase.

The dictionary definition of 'banality' centres around a lack of originality, and perhaps this goes some way to understanding Arendt. Kant's writing considered spontaneity to be inextricably linked, indeed the basis of, freedom. In fact in the Critique of Pure Reason the idea of 'understanding' is said to be spontaneous, which Kant defined initially as bringing forth representations from itself. Both theoretical and practical knowledge are, for Kant, denoted by spontaneity. It is self evident that spontaneity and freedom are intrinsically linked. McDowell writes that spontaneity or conceptual activity takes place in the realm of freedom. For Kant spontaneity 'brings forth representations from itself', it is the ultimate freedom machine.

It follows that to deny spontaneity is to deny freedom. Total domination, which strives to organize the infinite plurality and differentiations of human beings as if all of humanity were just one individual is possible only if each and every person can be reduced to a never-changing identity of reactions, so that each of these bundles of reaction can be exchanged at random for any other. (The Origins of Totalitarianism 1966 (438)). According to Arendt totalitarianism is about domination of the individual to such an extent that the individual, certainly in the Kantian sense as outlined earlier, ceases to exist. In a perfect totalitarian state each individual would be, to large extent, a copy of the next, and so on and so on. The state becomes the family, in fact more than the family. In losing one's individuality one gains this all powerful (as far as that country is concerned) totality, similar in many ways to a deity, but so powerful that it permeates all lives.

Eichmann, according to Arendt, is a classic case. Arendt found Eichmann 'thoughtless', which she defined as 'the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of' truths, which have become trivial and empty'. Eichmann's concern was both selfish and empty, in the sense that empathy seemed to have been dug out of him. Eichmann could not answer this central question of Kantian ethics 'Could I live with myself if I did this deed', and yet he could recite Kant's categorical imperative. This tells us much e.g. certain words mean nothing, he is not engaging, words need to be shown in action. What is to be made of that? This question must haunt the compassionate human being, for it can be levelled at all Nazis and those with similar views, just as much as at Eichmann.

Now it will be self evident to the average person that a chasm exists between Eichmann's parroting off of Kant's categorical imperative and Eichmann's behaviour. In fact parroting off is a good description, since it invokes the image of a parrot repeating sounds that mean absolutely nothing to the bird. The words have no meaning for Eichmann, they are a delusion. And not just any old delusion either. These meaningless words cover up a monster on a monumental scale that any right thinking human being would find repulsive. A man who can allude to Kant's imperative in this way, and presumably not see how utterly devoid of humanity it shows him to be, may indeed be called banal in the Arendt sense. It also shows deep wickedness.

Eichmann, in his trial, used a number of contrived arguments to excuse his wickedness. One of these arguments was that ' if he hadn't done it then someone else would'. But Eichmann has, apparently, read Kant. Even a cursory reading of Kant would reveal that acting both with regard to moral imperatives and doing so autonomously is at the centre of his moral philosophy. Putting the notion that 'if he hadn't done it then someone else would' is not even a serious attempt at defence, indeed it is risible, in Kantian terms. The defendant is an autonomous agent. Here he is seeking to defend himself by denying his own autonomy. Using the 'someone else' argument throws the idea of morality through the window. Now the argument ceases to be about right or wrong and becomes a discussion about self seeking, personal ambition and ego. What the business is actually about seems to matter little, the major concern is what will this position do for me in the hierarchy I have chosen to belong to. It is a grotesque and disturbing form of argument in these circumstances, and says much about the 'thoughtlessness' that Arendt says is Eichmann's hallmark.

For the truly moral being, whether they have considered Kant's Categorical Imperative or not, the notion of legacy is all important. Arguably this is the most important impact on humanity that an individual human being has. We need only think of Bonhoeffer, or Lawrence "Titus" Oates, Violette Szabo and many others to realise the importance of moral legacy, it is, perhaps, what humanity is all about. Eichmann's complete lack of perspective in these matters leads one to support the idea of his 'thoughtlessness' in the way outlined above.

Les Jones is a retired educational professional having been Head of Department in Secondary Schools and Colleges, as well as GCSE and A level examiner and senior examiner. He has a long standing interest in writing, literature and philosophy. He had always tried to base his writing interests in the community, at one time chairing Lancashire Writers, contributing to local radio and drama.